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How we were right and wrong about China?
Miben volt igazunk és miben tévedtünk 
Kínával kapcsolatban?
It is a pleasure to accept the invitation to contribute an essay to this Festschrift, celebrating Prof. 
Mihaly Simai’s 90th birthday. For many decades, Simai has been one of Hungary’s most productive 
and respected economists. His influence has spread much beyond our small country’s borders, 
given the many prominent positions he held at the United Nations and at other international 
organizations, and that so many of his publications are in English.
Prof. Simai’s research productivity is amazing. He is the author (mostly) or the co-author 
of nearly 300 scholarly publications, 40 of them books; the rest: articles, chapters, and special 
studies.2
We met and interacted regularly during the 1980s at the annual meetings of the Hungarian-
American Economic Roundtable (held, alternatingly, in the US and in Hungary). 
During the last 30 years we met occasionally, somewhere around the world; for the past 
decade, in Budapest, where we both live. Talking to him has always yielded insights about 
analysing and interpreting contemporary global issues.
Even though I am not aware that Mihaly’s main research focus has ever been China, most 
of his writings have a global dimension. He has often mentioned China’s experiences, in various 
context.
My China experiences
My experience with China goes back to about 40 years. In 1981, and again in 1982, I was sent by 
the World Bank to Shanghai to give a series of presentations on Hungary’s economic reforms to 
an influential group of Chinese economists working on Deng Xiaoping’s reforms. My trips were 
arranged in response to China’s requests to the World Bank.
I recall that the key points of my 1981and 1982 presentations in China were the following: 
(1)  Allowing much greater scope for small-scale private-sector initiatives, for example, in 
agriculture and trade, yields impressive results, quickly; 
(2)  At the same time, however, attempts to prompt large, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 
via a set of artificial rules to function as if they were operating in a real market economy 
(another key aspect of the New Economic Mechanism (NEM) Hungary introduced in 
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1968) will fail because a market environment cannot be ‘simulated’; competition among 
producers and customers must be real;
(3)   The secret of China’s long-term economic success will be to allow real market forces to 
guide the actions of a majority of the country’s producers and customers.
At this point I should note that during the late 1970s and early 1980s, when China’s economic 
reforms got underway, the country was predominantly rural. The reforms in agriculture 
eventually led to ‚leasing’ much of the land for 99 years (for four generations!) to those who lived 
on it was tantamount to fully privatizing it. It brought almost immediate, strikingly successful 
results. The reform increased production, especially the supply of food and consumer goods. It 
allowed hundreds of millions of starving people to escape from abject poverty. And it rekindled 
the entrepreneurial talents and dedicated hard work so typical of the Chinese.
One of the most momentous of many further reforms was the massive privatization of 
just about all the country’s labour-intensive SOEs in 1992; The world’s largest-scale enterprise 
privatization program ever. However, those SOEs constituted a small fraction of the SOEs’ assets, 
as the higher capital-intensive SOEs were not privatized.
In 2004, and again in 2006, I was invited to teach a semester’s course on international business 
at China’s leading MBA program, the China-Europe International Business School (CEIBS) in 
Shanghai. It was then, by pure chance, that I learned the circumstances that prompted China in the 
early 1980s to request the World Bank to send an expert to discuss economic reforms in Hungary.
CEIBS’ full-time faculty at the time was a balanced mixture of Chinese professors with 
Western PhDs and highly-qualified Western professors from several (mostly Western European) 
countries. In the full-time MBA programme the language of instruction was English. CEIBS had 
only a single full-time faculty member who lectured in Chinese, Prof. Wu Jinglian, the former 
Chairman of Deng Xiaoping’s Council of Economic Advisors. My Chinese colleagues urged me 
to attend Wu’s lectures. The MBA program’s foreign-students (nearly a third of CEIBS’s MBA 
cohorts then) and I listened to several of Wu’s presentations, via an interpreter:
 I remember Chairman Deng striding into a meeting with his economic advisors, recalled 
Prof. Wu: ‘Comrades, look around the globe! Everywhere where Chinese live in large numbers 
(Deng mentioned Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Chinese communities in the USA, 
Canada, and Australia) are economically hugely successful. Therefore, there is nothing wrong 
with us, Chinese, in terms of our innate abilities. We are so backward here in China because 
our economic system is not working well. I urge you to look around the world and find socialist 
countries that had undertaken successful economic reforms and distill for us the lessons we 
should learn.’Prof. Wu continued:
 ‘The first country we studied carefully was Hungary, which introduced its NEM in 1968. 
During the 1970s, Hungary’s economic performance became notably better than those of its 
unreformed socialist neighbours. Therefore, we started to focus on what we could learn from 
that country’s economic reforms.’3
3 The English translation of Prof. Wu Jinglian’s insightful book, Understanding and Interpreting Chinese Eco-
nomic Reforms (Singapore: Thomson-South-Western, 2005) has a section on the economic reform program 
of Hungary.
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China’s economic structure and performance
By the time I spent two non-consecutive semesters teaching at CEIBS – during the middle years 
of the new century’s first decade – China had many years of economic reform experience.One 
insight I learned from my Chinese colleagues at CEIBS was that to gain a reasonably accurate 
measure of the structure of China’s economy, one should not juxtapose the GDP share of 
‘the state sector’ against that of ‘the private sector’, as we often do in the ‘established market 
economies’ (EMEs) of the West. In China, the appropriate juxtaposition was is to be the ‘state-
sector’ (comprised of the SOEs remaining under the control of central, provincial and local 
governments, plus government administration at all levels) with that of the ‘non-state sector’. 
The key point was that it is not the legal ownership, but the extent of market-distorting state 
interference that should be the main criterion for establishing what kind of economy China 
had at that time. Although much of the non-state sector was, legally, not private, its actors made 
economic decisions that, for all practical purposes, were similar to those that truly private 
entities would make.4 
I remember having seen reliable calculations in Shanghai that showed that the structure of 
China’s economy around the middle of the first decade of the 21st century – that is, 15 years ago 
– was approximately the following:
Table 1: Economic indicators of the state and non-state sectors in China
State sector Non-state sector
Share of GDP produced 1/3rd 2/3rd
Share in employment 12% 88%
Ownership of fixed  
productive assets Well over 50%5 The rest
Source: own source
Both the above numbers and their juxtapositions with comparable statistics in the EMEs – that 
is, the countries in North America, Continental Europe, Japan and Australia (the group often 
referred to as ‘the West’), whose private-sector owners were/are typically private legally, too – 
show that China had transformed, quite some time ago already, its poorly-functioning centrally 
planned economic (CPE) system into a predominantly market-driven one. China’s capitalism 
is, of course, state-directed, but much more so than those of many EMEs that also have SOEs, 
though considerably fewer and more loosely controlled than those in China. 
4 The non-state sector included tens of thousands of so-called ‘township and village enterprises’ (TVEs); 
the growing number of special economic zones (SEZs), where the governments’ economic controls were 
greatly relaxed; the fully- or partly foreign-owned enterprises (like Chinese-Western joint ventures); and 
the private leasing of vehicles and other assets from the SOEs.
5 This is because the asset structure of a large majority of the SOEs has been heavily capital-intensive.
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Turning to the main indicator of China’s long-term economic performance, the chart below shows 
its officially reported growth rates from the time it became a communist country in 1949 through 2018.
Chart 1: China’s annual GDP growth
Source: CEIC Data
The basic story of China’s 4-decade-long growth performance is so well known that only a few 
explanatory comments are made on the chart:
•  Growth rates were highly volatile under Chairman Mao Zedong (1949-1976). The 
dramatic downturns from the late 1950s through the mid-1970s were due to the political 
upheavals engineered by Mao (such as the Cultural Revolution), accompanied by extremely 
dysfunctional economic policies.
•  The growth tempo has been the most impressive during the past 40 years (since 1978). Even 
if one suspects, not without cause, that China’s official growth rates are a smidgen upward 
biased, independent calculations – although they tend to come up with different annual 
figures – generally confirm the long-term trend shown by China’s official statistics. And 
those of us who have been traveling to China periodically for nearly four decades could 
only be awed by the dramatic economic progress the country has been making steady, 
clearly visible to the naked eye.
•  While a dozen or more factors have been identified as being responsible for China’s 
spectacular economic growth, the most fundamental reasons, in my view, have been 
the widespread marketization of its economy; the decentralized implementation of the 
reforms; the intense domestic and international market competition that its huge number 
of producers and consumers have been facing; the quality of government administration; 
major improvements in education and healthcare; and to the Chinese people’s vaunted 
diligence and willingness to save.
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•  One consequence of China’s sustained strong economic performance, as Simai noted, has 
been, that the percent of its population living in abject poverty had declined dramatically, 
from 61% in 2000 to 4% by 2015.6
•  Many economists have argued that China has simply been enjoying the short- and medium-
term advantages of economic backwardness. As a latecomer, it could massively borrow 
and copy Western technology and knowhow of all kind. Sooner or later, however, so the 
argument went, China’s growth rates will become ‘normal’, similar to those of the EMEs and 
developing countries.
•  China’s growth rates have indeed been slowing for some time, especially during the past 
decade. But even in its fourth post-reform decade, China’s moderately slowed economic 
expansion was still about twice that of the average of the growth tempo of the EMEs. And 
there are credible forecasts that, barring unforeseen disasters (such as a massive and lasting 
virus pandemic that would hurt China mainly), the noted growth discrepancy is likely to 
continue into the foreseeable future, in China’s favour.
Western attitudes towards China’s reforms
The broad consensus of Western economists around the globe – who have been focusing on 
economic system reforms in the former ‘socialist’ countries (more accurately, in the former 
CPEs), like that of the Soviet Union and its successor states, the countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) and of China – has long been that China, too, should be encouraged to move 
further and further along marketizing its economy and liberalizing its foreign economic relations 
because 
(1)  those steps will make China economically successful and continue to improve the 
standard of living of a great majority of the Chinese people; 
(2)  the marketization of a CPE will inevitably lead to a liberalization (democratisation?) 
of the country’s domestic political system and to its more responsible behaviour in the 
international arena.
(3)  accomplishing the above would be an impressive sign of the ‘victory’ (to put it crudely) of 
capitalism and democracy over a CPE and the Communist political system.
With respect to the all-import second argument – or, to put it more realistically, the assumption 
– it seemed to be aligned with, and support, Francis Fukuyama’s widely-talked about theory 
that he came up within the early 1990s. He argued that the West, having won the Cold War 
(1945-1991), the inevitable future, as far ahead as the eye can see, is that more and more 
governments will operate within the framework of parliamentary democracy and market 
economy. In his 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man, and in several of his famous 
articles published around that time, Fukuyama explained that by the ‘end of history’ he meant 
that liberal democracy and a market economy will eventually be the final systemic structure of 
all nations. There can be no progression from there to an alternative system that would be better.
6 Simai M. (2016): A Harmadik Évezred Nyitánya: A zöld fejlődés esélyei és globális kockázatok [Overture to 
the Third Millennium: Prospects for Green Development and Global Risks] Corvina Kiadó, Budapest, p. 344. 
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Those who criticize Fukuyama, his supporters argued, make the mistake of equating history with 
events. Fukuyama does not claim that events will stop occurring, only that, in the long- term, 
democracy and market dominance will become more and more prevalent, although there may 
be ‘temporary’ setbacks, so that totalitarianism may return and last for decades or longer.This 
is not the place to evaluate Fukuyama’s theory. One must note, however, that it cannot ever be 
tested or used to make short- or medium-term forecasts because any development that goes 
contrary to Fukuyama’s trend prediction can always be called ‘temporary’. And in the long run, 
as John Maynard Keynes sarcastically observed, we are all dead.
The only point of referencing Fukuyama here is that the systemic changes that were taking 
place in Russia, CEE, and China during the 1990s appear to have validated Fukuyama’s trend 
prediction and reinforced the arguments of those advocating that the West should actively 
support the reforms efforts of China’s (and other ‘transition-economies’). Economic reforms 
and its growing integration into the world economy would force China to liberalize politically 
at home and to become a more responsible stakeholder in the international system. This idea, 
sometimes called ‘convergence theory’, was that as China grew wealthier, its economic and 
political systems would converge more and more toward those of the EMEs.
The ‘we’ in the title of this essay refers to that group of (mostly Western academic) economists 
and political scientists who have been focusing on economic and political system changes in the 
former CPEs, called ‘transition economies’. Their above-summarized views had some influence on 
Western business people and politicians. To the former, they reinforced the view that deepening 
economic ties with China (and other transition countries) serve not only a particular business’ 
profit interests but also yields social benefits for the West. For Western politicians, it diverted 
their focus away from the civil liberties and human-rights records of authoritarian China (and 
of Russia and others). Fukuyama’s theory was comforting: those problems will automatically 
disappear, in the long run.
Where we were right about China?
Until a few years ago – let’s say, arbitrarily, through the first decade of this century, those of us 
in the ‘we’ camp could claim, and even boast, that we were ‘right on the money’, that everything 
was happening in China, in all the three spheres mentioned in the preceding section, just as 
predicted.
We can continue to claim today that we were – and remain – unqualifiedly correct about the 
first argument about why and for whom the continued marketization of China’s economy was 
and will continue to be the most beneficial.
At the same time, something new and discomforting seems to have been seeping into our 
subconscious mind regarding China’s continued economic performance. Trying to define 
succinctly what that ‘new’ is: a nagging doubt about China’s ‘convergence’ with the EMEs, even 
regarding its economic system and performance.
Let me explain. For a long time, say, for the first two or perhaps even three decades after 
China had embarked on its economic reform path (in 1978), its spectacular growth has been 
somewhat discounted in the West. Many have been arguing that China simply has been enjoying 
the short- and medium-term advantages of economic backwardness: as a latecomer, it could 
massively borrow and copy Western technology and know-how.China’s growth rates have 
indeed been slowing for some time. But it has been surprising, and disquieting to some, that the 
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prediction that China’s growth rates would ‘converge’ to those of the EMEs did not happen, and 
it seems less and less likely that it will happen during our lifetime. 
So, the quiet alarm goes, the issue may no longer be whether China’s economic system and 
performance would converge to ours, but whether we in the West would be able to match China’s 
economic performance, and what would be the long-term consequences of not being able to do so?
Where were we likely wrong about China?
One area where ‘we’ (Western academic experts) on economic system change in China had been 
wrong was our assertion during the 1980s that a reform that would be based on that SOEs should, 
simultaneously, fulfill centrally planned economic targets and be allowed to dispose of the rest of 
their output on the ‘free’ market, would be unworkable. The analogy often used was: ‘Imagine if 
vehicular traffic in a city would require some vehicles to drive in one direction on the right side 
of the road, while other cars and trucks would be allowed to drive (in the same direction) on the 
left side. Utter chaos would ensue.’Not so. The Chinese did exactly what we thought would not 
work. There was a period during the 1980s when SOEs were obligated to fulfill centrally planned 
output and distribution targets, after which they could (and did) behave as profit-maximizing 
capitalist enterprises. Gradually, most centrally-set targets were reduced and then eliminated.
Even though China’s economic system has been, for quite some time, similar in fundamental 
aspects to those of the EMEs – in that producers and consumers have been making a vast 
majority of their economic resource allocation decisions in response to market forces established 
(with very few exceptions) by a massive number of freely-competing producers and consumers, 
China’s authorities do not like to admit this. China’s top officials claim that China’s economic 
system is different from those of the capitalist countries. Their favored term: ‘We have a socialist 
system with Chinese characteristics’. 
My less hazy label for China’s economic and political system is this: A market-driven 
economy, with the monopoly Party’s total final authority over politics; over all state 
institutions, including the courts; over the SOEs and even over private firms, if interference 
with them is deemed to be in the Party’s interest. The single most important objective of the 
monopoly “Communist” Party is to perpetuate its power and to govern the country. For that, 
maintaining firm control is absolutely essential. 
We, in the West used to think that with the amazing volume of information that the market 
system provides to its participants, especially in this age of the internet, and with the growing 
mobility of the Chinese people (inside their country and for a significant number even abroad), 
pervasive central controls would simply not work.In my university courses about China that 
I taught until a decade ago, I used to assert that Marxist, Communist, and any other kind of 
ideology is dead in China, that ideology has been replaced by the pursuit of improved living 
standards and wealth at the level of individuals, companies, and the nation-state. I also used to 
believe in the basic tenets of the convergence theory.
I would make none of the above statements so categorically today, for the following reasons:
•  Yes, there has indeed been growing mobility and personal freedom in China, but only for 
those who stay within the boundaries defined by the Party. China’s population has been 
taught, continually since birth, to be disciplined and to adhere to the rules and the expected 
behaviours in their families, in their schools, and at their workplaces. Acting differently 
than other members of the ‘team’ brings ostracism, which is the most effective ‘policing 
KÖZ-GAZDASÁG 2020/1140
instrument’ in a society whose members have been acculturated from ages immemorial 
(by Confucianism) to accept hierarchy and the importance of subordinating some of 
the individual’s interests to that or those of the team.  A dramatic illustration of how this 
works in China’s state-controlled capitalist society today is a brilliant 2019 documentary 
of what happened when in 2014, Chinese auto glass manufacturer Fuyao invested $500 
million to buy and to re-equip a former General Motors auto-glass plant in Dayton, Ohio, 
that had been closed since 2008.  The documentary, sponsored and introduced by former 
President Barack Obama and his wife, Michelle, films events both at the Ohio plant and at 
Fuyao’s headquarters in China.7 Among the documentary’s many insights are that strong 
nationalism and pride in China ‘winning’ a growing number of its economic encounters, 
even vis-à-vis the US, form the core of a mutually reinforcing new ideology that energies 
and helps keep the Chinese people within the boundaries set by the Party.8
•  China’s state-controlled media makes abundantly clear, with widely publicized examples, 
what happens to those who do not stay within the boundaries defined by the Party.
•  China has become the world leader in high-technology systems of control, from algorithms 
that censor social media, to facial-recognition systems of its citizens at their work 
environments and in public places. Google cannot be accessed in China.
•  One further reason to doubt the validity of the assumption of systemic convergence is the 
many-sided and growing criticisms of the political as well as of the economic systems of 
the EMEs. Of the political systems, that democratic elections have become less and less 
about informed citizens making choices on key issues, and more and more about which 
candidate can spend more on advertising and on brainwashing the electorate (with fake 
news, for example). Also, politicians actually stand in the way of solving mankind’s pressing 
problems, such as the environment, because all they care about is winning the next election. 
The main problems with ‘our’ market-economy system: it is still prone to major recessions 
that badly hurt people (such as the Great Recession of 2008-12) and that income- and 
wealth-distributions are getting more and more unequal. The main relevant impact of these 
criticisms on the theory of ‘convergence’ is that we have become less certain that the EMEs’ 
political and economic systems are as attractive to others to converge toward as we thought, 
say, two decades ago.
Contrary to our assumptions that the marketisation and the global economic integration 
of China will lead to a liberalisation (democratisation?) of the country’s domestic political 
system and to more responsible behaviour in the international arena, recent trends suggest the 
opposite.  We see in China today a president who changed the law to enable him to retain power 
for life; who ordered that communist party committees be formed in all major institutions and 
7 An American Factory, a documentary film available on Netflix.
8 Simai’s observation is relevant here: ‘Human beings … are members of societies within which values, 
ideologies, customs, and history condition their ways of thinking… Culture, together with other key factors 
(geographic and historical conditions, for example) is one of the most enduring variables in conditioning 
changes and in influencing the forms and content of governance.’ [Simai M. (2001): The Age of Global Trans-
formations: The Human Dimension. Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, p. 21.]
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enterprises which can overrule management in certain areas; and who has been expanding show 
trials, torture and executions to stifle real or imagined dissent at home.
In the speeches and official documents reporting on China President ‘Xi Jinping thought’, he 
is quoted as talking about the bitter struggle between ‘socialism with Chinese characteristics’ and 
‘anti-China western forces’ promulgating ‘extremely malicious’ ideas of freedom, democracy, 
and human rights.9
In the international arena, too, China has become more assertive. For example, it has been 
intimidating many of its neighbours in Southeast Asia with verbal threats, wooing them with 
economic carrots and sticks; and threatening them with aggressive military ventures, such as 
creating military bases on artificial island in the South China Sea, close to the countries with 
which it has disputes over-controlling land or sea areas. Another aspect of China’s growing 
assertiveness is its ‘wolf-style diplomacy’: vituperative verbal attacks on any Western government, 
diplomat, or media that dares to publicly criticize China’s actions at home (for example, vis-à-vis 
the Uighurs in Xinjiang or the natives in Tibet) or abroad.
In sum, we ourselves, as well as our Chinese (and other) adversaries have become less firmly 
convinced – clearly doubtful, may be more accurate – that the EME’s values and institutions, 
especially our democratic political systems, are really attractive to converge to, and are openly 
saying so. The mirror side is that we are becoming less convinced of the desirability and feasibility 
of pressuring China (and other adversaries) to accept our values, such as human rights and non-
discrimination, as well as our political institutions.10
Interpretations
The just-mentioned trends in China have made even some of ‘us’ (academic specialists in economic 
and political system transformations) worried, in some cases even feeling guilty for the surely minor 
roles we might have played in the past by offering systemic advice to China. A stellar example is 
Janos Kornai, one of Hungary’s internationally best-known economists, who wrote an article in The 
Financial Times, arguing that we, economists, share the blame for China’s ‘monstrous’ turn:11 
‘The leaders of modern China won’t be satisfied with turning their country into one of 
the leading powers of the multipolar word. Their aim is to become the hegemonic leader 
of the globe.
The idea is not, of course, to station Chinese soldiers everywhere. The means of 
domination would be different in each country. Some would literally be under military 
occupation. Elsewhere it would be enough to form governments compliant to Chinese 
wishes.’
9 Jamil Anderlini: ‘China is taking its ideological fight abroad’ Financial Times, January 10, 2020. 
10 Some might even start advocating a ‘reverse convergence’, that is, us converging toward China’s appa-
rently well-performing economic and stable political system. This is certainly not something that I would 
advocate. Nor probably would anyone who learns the details of China’s culturally embedded political sy-
stem; it simply could not be transferred in a workable way to a Western (especially Anglo-Saxon) society.
11 July 10, 2019
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Kornai then enumerates the recent ‘chilling challenges’ that have taken place in China; a bill 
of particulars similar to those cited in this essay above. He then argues that:
‘Western intellectuals are partly responsible for this nightmare (because) we not only 
watched China’s transformation with approval but actively contributed to them. We are 
the modern version of … Frankenstein, the 19th-century tale of experimenting scientists 
who brought a dead body to life, using that era’s technology: the electric shock. The 
resurrected creature became a murderous monster.
 Many of us bear moral responsibility for not protesting against the resurrection of 
the Chinese monster, or even worse because we have taken on an active role as advisors; 
myself included.’
In my view, Kornai overdoes it, as far as Western advisors to China are concerned. He would 
be more credible in his blaming if he could and would establish that those advising China knew, 
at the time, that the assumptions of systemic convergence were wrong. But we did not, hence our 
motives were ‘pure’; I certainly do not share Kornai’s mea culpa.
More significantly, we Western intellectuals, have been giving ourselves too much credit. 
China’s path of reform and growth would have changed little without our ‚advice’. In retrospect, 
China had never thought of us as ‚advisers’. We were merely a source of information (facts and 
experiences) from among a large number of sources the Chinese always go to. Taking into 
account their situation and goals, they formulate Chinese-type solutions that suit their needs.
What was done, was done, Kornai argues; a mistake by hindsight. He then urges governments 
and business people should think twice before helping China economically, especially with the 
technology that can be used for physical or digital warfare.
Thus, in this area, Kornai seems to endorse the Trump Administration’s decision to confront 
China with higher tariffs and to tighten restrictions on technology exports and imports.
Many experts note that the broader context in which the US-China confrontation is taking 
place is similar to what had already happened several times in the course of history, what is 
known as Thucydides’ trap. The ancient Greek historian had observed that the Peloponnesian 
war (431BC – 404BC) was caused by the growth of Athenian power and the fear that this 
caused in Sparta. Professor Graham Allison examined 16 historical cases of rivalry between 
established and newly emerging rival powers, finding that in 12 out of the 16, the rivalry ended 
in confrontation. On that basis, he concludes that China and the US may well be on a collision 
course for war, a warning he explained in several articles in the Financial Times and elaborated 
in his recent book.12
Tentative Conclusions
I am aware that the above remarks may be considered by certain readers as an overreaction 
to the above-described medium-term trends in China and in the West. It is not inconceivable 
that, during the next decade or two, events will occur in China, as well as in the West, that 
would create a comparative system environment and expectations that would resemble more 
12 Allison, G. (2019): Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap? Carlton-North, 
Australia 
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what we had two decades ago than what we have today. In brief, I am not arguing that our earlier 
presumption of systemic convergence and all that was definitely wrong. I am only saying that we 
have good reasons to be much less certain today about systemic convergence than what we (and 
Fukuyama) believed, predicted, and supported in the not-too-distant past.
I agree with Kornai that the West should be firm in denying China (and our other adversaries) 
any technology that may be useful for military or digital warfare or for controlling/regimenting 
individuals. Also, that individuals, NGOs, businesses and governments in the West should 
strongly raise their voices against actions by China (etc.) at home that blatantly deny basic 
human rights to segments of their populations, or actions abroad that clearly go beyond the 
country’s legitimate security needs.
At the same time, I am also of the view that the focus of the West should not be to impede 
China’s economic development in any way we could; that would not likely to work; instead, it 
would probably strengthen China’s resolve to continue of the same path.  Instead, our efforts 
should be concentrated on correcting the many dysfunctional aspects of our economic and 
political systems.
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